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This paper investigates how the size of a firm affects its licensing strategy for patented 
technologies through empirical analysis of the characteristics at the technological, firm, and industry 
levels.  Only firms with commercialization capabilities are considered in this study in order to compare 
the incentives of utilizing technologies internally with the incentives of selling them for licensing 
revenue.  Focusing on licensing motivated by non-strategic purposes, empirical analysis shows that large 
companies are less willing to license patents that fit into their business focus, as well as those which have 
a low technological value in general.  On the other hand, small firms are more inclined to license patents 
which are more relevant to their business focus, but less innovative on average.  This study also finds that 
market share and competition intensity are important f ctors in their licensing decisions: the more 
competitive and the smaller the market share of the pat nts owned by large firms, the higher the chance 
that firms will list them on the market.  In line with the revenue versus competition framework by Arora 
and Fosfuri (2003), this paper concludes that large firms are generally more concerned about the rent 
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Over the past few decades, the market for technology has grown consistently and is emerging as a 
dominant platform for technology transfer.  In 1983, the worldwide royalties and license revenues for 
technology were about 10 billion US dollars; by 2000, the figure had increased to 80 billion US dollars 
(Athreye and Cantwell, 2007); Gindley and Teece (1997) point to the increasing use of technology 
licensing as a source of revenue by companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments, and 
AT&T during the 1990s, and IBM was reported to have generated almost 1 billion US dollars from patent 
licensing in 1999 (Rivette and Kline, 2000).  Given the size of licensing revenue, the market for 
technology has caught the attention of academic resea chers and practitioners in the industry. 
 Companies with both research and development capabilities only commercialized innovations 
developed internally in the past, as traditional wisdom suggested that companies are more profitable from 
developing and commercializing innovations internally (Teece, 1988).  When other companies were 
looking for technologies to license and commercialize, the technology holders were largely insular and
suffered from the “not-invented-here” syndrome (Arora et al., 2001).  However, the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act in 1980 encouraged American universities to explore possible sources of revenue by selling or 
licensing their patented innovations (Mowery et al., 2001).  As a result, more useful and innovative 
technologies became available on the market and companies started to look for others’ innovations.  As
the demand for technologies increased, more companies were willing to make their patents available on 
the market, and patented innovations started to be treated as tradable commodities (Arora et al., 2003).  
Consequently, companies began to shift their resources to technology transactions by establishing a 




While some companies aggressively licensed their patents, others were less active in selling or 
acquiring technologies in the market.  It is, therefor , important to examine the factors that affect irms’ 
licensing decisions and technology transactions to better understand the function of the technology 
market.  Several theoretical and empirical studies analyzed firms’ licensing decisions, but did not 
explicitly emphasize the role of firm size.  This paper aims to analyze the licensing decisions and 
technology transfers with a particular emphasis on the impact of firm size. 
The situation considered in this study is summarized as follows.  Consider a patent holder who is 
capable of commercializing his patent but is also contemplating licensing it.  If he has not commercialized 
it, licensing will not create competition in the product market and he can make positive licensing revenue.  
On the other hand, if he has commercialized the patnt, licensing will invite competition and reduce his
revenue in the product market (Arora et al., 2001).  For a large firm with a significantly large market 
share, the loss in revenue from the increasing competition may outweigh the positive licensing revenue 
and the firm may therefore be reluctant to license the patent.  A small firm with a small market share; 
however, may be more active in licensing because the licensing royalties are more likely to compensate 
for the loss in revenue due to increasing in competition.  Thus, firms of different sizes may be very 
different in making the licensing decisions.  Such decisions are mainly driven by profit, which is often 
related to the characteristics of the patent itself, its assignee, and the industry it belongs to.   
The objective of this paper is to examine the differences between large and small firms in their 
willingness to license by incorporating the characteris ics of usefulness to its assignee, importance, and 
innovativeness of a patent, market share of the patnt holder, and the industry competition intensity.  This 
objective is achieved by investigating these characte istics of patented technologies both on and off the 
market which are provided by large and small business nterprise sectors (BES).  Only BESs with 




technology and product markets.  Other patent assignees that do not possess such capabilities, such as 
universities, small research institutions and government research agencies, are excluded from this study.  
The study focuses on the supply side of the markets of echnology, and restricts to licensing activities 
motivated by non-strategic factors. 
The licensing decision of a patent holder is analyzed using the revenue versus competition 
framework developed Arora and Fosfuri (2003).  Unlike Kim and Vonortas (2006) and Fosfuri (2006), 
this study focuses on the willingness of patent holders to license instead of the actual licensing activities 
themselves.  Gambardella et al. (2007) investigated patent holders’ willingness to license patents that
were granted by the Europe Patent Office (EPO), where this paper analyzes patents granted by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Similar to Palomeras (2007), this paper looks at the 
determinants of technology licensing as motivated by non-strategic reasons, or pure-revenue licensing.  
However, this paper also considers firm size, includes characteristics at the firm and industry level, and 
refines the empirical analysis with a broader dataset. 
This study is structured in the following way.  Chapter two reviews and discusses the literature on 
licensing and the technology markets.  Chapter three describes the theoretical background and construct  
several testable hypotheses.  After demonstrating the data collection process and empirical model in 
chapter four, chapter five presents and explains the results and implications of this study.  The conclusion 






2.1 Use of Patents 
A patent is the state-granted exclusive right that prevents anyone other than its owner from exploiting he 
technology for a limited period, and a technology license is an agreement whereby an owner of a 
technological intellectual property allows another party to use, modify, and/or resell that property in 
exchange for a compensation, which is called licensing fees or royalties.  Giuri et al. (2007) list six uses 
of a patented technology by the patent holder, including internal use, licensing, cross-licensing, licensing 
and use, blocking competitors, and sleeping patents.  Based on a survey questionnaire distributed in the 
U.S. manufacturing sectors, Cohen et al. (2000) found that there are a number of motives for obtaining 
patents: commercialization, licensing, the prevention of copying, preventing rivals from patenting similar 
and related inventions, leverage for negotiation, and the prevention of suits.  In the big picture, these uses 
can be divided into two main groups: strategic uses and non-strategic uses.  This generalization is 
supported by Ford and Ryan (1981), who suggest that fully-integrated companies license for either 
strategic or financial reasons.   
 In terms of strategic purposes, patents are not used directly to obtain financial returns, but to bring 
financial gains in the long run.  Cohen et al. (2000) discovered that preventing others from patenting a d 
commercializing, or blocking, is one of the main motives for U.S. manufacturing firms to patent.  Another 
strategic usage of patents is trolling, an action in which one purchases patents solely for the purposes f 
aggressively extracting a licensing fee (Barker, 2005).   Patent licensing can also be motivated by 
strategic considerations.  Shapiro (2001) demonstrate  that some patents are used for cross-licensing, 




rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology, such 
as semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, nd the Internet.  Shapiro and Varian (1998) 
suggest that establishing an innovation as the standard for the industry is also an incentive for a patent 
holder to license.  Fulton and Yiannaka (2007) show that it is beneficial for the patent holder to 
strategically license a new product innovation to its competitors if it is unable to deter entry. 
 On the other hand, patents can also be applied for non-strategic incentives, mostly to 
commercialize the technology internally within a firm.  Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2008) found 
that the number of products produced by a firm increases when the firm patents.  Another major non-
strategic use of a patent is to license it to other firms only for royalties.  Giuri et al. (2007) found that 
about 6.2% of the European Union (EU) patents are utilized in this way.  Finally, a patent can be left 
unused, in which case is called a sleeping patent.  These patents are usually considered unprofitable if 
they are commercialized and are, at the same time, unattractive for potential licensees.  Palomeras (2003) 
explores the technological characteristics of a sleeping patent and asserts that some remain unused 
because they do not fit into their holder’s core competency, though they may be valuable in other 
industries.  This paper focuses on the non-strategic usage of patents, in particular those for internal uses 
and externally used for licensing purposes.  
 
2.2 Technology Market, Technology Licensing, and Li censing Determinants 
The abovementioned licensing activities show that on one hand there are companies willing to license 
their own patents, while on the other hand there are also companies that want to license patents from 
others.  As a result, markets for different technologies, or patents, are formed.  Arora et al. (2001) provide 
a concise definition of the markets for technology: they are markets for intellectual property that is 




significantly to constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that is 
licensed. 
Recent growth in the technology market has prompted research on the licensing behaviour of 
firms.  Assuming that the patent holder is the sole technology holder, Rockett (1990) suggests that 
choosing its competitor is an important motivation behind the licensor’s behaviour, because the licensor 
will have to face competition after his patent has expired, which has a direct impact on his profits.  Arora 
et al. (2001) relax the assumption of having a monop listic technology holder and study how the revenue 
effect and rent dissipation effect influence the licensing decision of a patent holder.  Arora and Fosfuri 
(2003) constructed a theoretical model showing thatcompetition in the product market provides an 
incentive for a patent holder to license in the technology market, given that there are multiple technology 
holders.  Then, based on this model and using results from an empirical study of large firms in the 
chemical industry, Fosfuri (2006) shows that the level of market competition and the size of a firm’s 
market share affect its licensing incentive and actu l licensing activities.  Palomeras (2007) also 
conducted an empirical study which assumed that all he patents listed in that marketplace are placed 
there for non-strategic, or pure-revenue, purposes.  With patents from the chemical and biological 
industries, he examined a firm’s willingness to license its patents for pure-revenue purposes and found 
that the importance, innovativeness, and scope of a patent, as well as how it fits into the firm’s core 
competency are key technology determinants that affect this willingness.  
Without using the competition model, Giuri et al. (2007) use PatVal, a large and comprehensive 
survey of inventors in six European countries and covering patents across all industries, to show that the 
share of patents only used for licensing of small firms are larger than that of large firms.  Kim and 
Vonortas (2006) also performed an empirical study on the determinants of technology licensing across all 




prior exposure to licensing, the growth rate of its primary sector, the strength of IPR protection, and the 
nature of the technology are all important determinants of whether or not the patent will actually be 
licensed.  Additionally, they discovered that small firms with lesser technological and product complexity 
tend to license their technology through exclusive l c nsing contracts, while large firms which usually 
have higher complexity in their technology and product tend to license their technology through non-
exclusive licensing contracts. 
 Research has also been conducted on the licensing strategies of firms that lack commercialization 
capabilities.  Teece (1986) claims that innovative firms without commercialization capabilities may find it 
difficult to survive, even if they are one of the leaders in their field, unless there is a strong appropriability 
regime and contractual modes such as licensing agreements are used.  While studying new-technology 
based firms (NTBF) in the biopharmaceutical industry, Kollmer and Dowling (2003) found that those 
NTBFs are often lacking commercialization capability.  They found differences in the use of licensing 
strategies between NTBFs that are both fully and partially integrated.  Davis (2005) also investigated he 
licensing strategies used by firms without commercialization capabilities.  Essentially, the business model 
of such firms requires them to develop intellectual properties and then generate revenue solely by 
licensing them. 
 
2.3 Firm Size and Innovation 
There is a vast literature about the relationship between innovativeness and the size of a firm.  Acs and 
Audretsch (1988) and Rogers (2004) show that differences in innovativeness between small and large 
firms are due to different behaviours towards innovation.  Using outputs per unit of (formal) R & D input, 
Acs and Audretsch (1990), Kleinknecht et al. (1993), and Rothwell and Dodgson (1994) have all shown 




Cohen and Klepper (1996) and Tether (1998) challenge the validity of the assumption made by previous 
researches: the economic value of innovations is unrelated to the size of the firm.  Tether (1998), in 
particular, has come to the conclusion that the economic value of innovations is positively correlated to 
the size of a firm, and hence large firms are more innovative than small ones.  Veugelers and Cassiman 
(1999) suggest that there is a positive but non-linear relationship between innovativeness and firm sizes.  
Rogers (2004) also found that the size of firms, as measured by the number of employees, is positively 
correlated to the innovativeness of manufacturing firms.  These correlations do; however, vary from 
industry to industry.  Lee (2005) shows that there is no relationship between patenting productivity and 
firm size in the pharmaceutical industry but that there is a positive correlation in the semi-conductor 
industry.   
However, the above results regarding the relationship between firm size and innovation have 
focused only on the production market, while ignorig the technology market and the characteristics of 
the innovations and the firm in question.  The only study to consider this issue in the technology market is 
Gambardella et al. (2007), which looked at the determinants of a patent that changed a firm’s willingness 
to license, and whether or not the patent is actually being licensed.  They determined that patent breadth, 
value, scope, and firm size all affect a firm’s willingness to license, but only firm size significantly 
influences the actual licensing activity of a patent o ce the decision to license has been made.  Althoug  
there are increasing patent transfers and licensing activities between firms, very few studies have 





Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
Palomeras (2007) claims that the technological nature of a patent affects its technological opportunity, 
costs of transfer, and the creation of competitors, which, in turn, have an impact on the potential profit, 
and so the licensing decision is influenced.  Meanwhile, the size of the patent holding firm also plays a 
key role in the licensing decision, because firms of different sizes are different in many ways.  They often 
have different approaches to the use of their patents, have significantly uneven distribution in their 
resources such as complementary assets, and have disparate market strategies in obtaining and 
maintaining market share. 
The licensing decision is driven by the total effect of licensing, or the change in profits a firm 
made from licensing.  Such profits consist of those btained from the product market and those from the 
technology market.  In the former case, where the pat nt is developed and commercialized internally, the 
profit depends on a number of factors, such as the technological opportunities created by the patent, the 
availability of complementary assets, and the competition environment in the product market.  In the 
latter case, where the patent is licensed, the profit depends on royalties and transaction costs.   
The total effect of licensing a patent is the potential profit gained through licensing by its 
assignee, which is the sum of the revenue effect and re t dissipation effect (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).  
The revenue effect refers to the economic impact in the technology market which the patent holder 
experiences as a result of licensing, and its magnitude is affected by two components: the technological 
opportunity of the patent for its assignee (Shane, 2001) and the transaction costs (Williamson, 1991).  In 




loss of profit from the product market due to an increase in product competition caused by licensing 
(Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).  A firm generally considers the magnitude of each effect and makes their 
licensing decisions based on the total estimated effect.  Key determinants in a firm’s licensing decisions 
therefore include the technological opportunity of its patent, the transaction costs, and the creation of its 
own competition. 
The technological opportunity of a patent is the chance for a firm to gain a profit by 
commercializing it, where the firm in question can be either the patent holder or a potential licensee.  The 
magnitude of the opportunity is positively related to the size of the product market, which affects the 
revenue that the potential licensees can extract from the licensed technology (Fosfuri, 2006), and in tur
plays a big part in the negotiation of the licensing fees.  Before a patent holder makes a licensing decision, 
it first must check whether the patent has already been internally developed and commercialized.  If the 
patent is commercialized, the assignee is making revenue from the product market.  Should another firm
be also attracted by the technological opportunities created by the patent and decides to license it, the 
assignee will potentially make a profit from the technology market at the expense of the loss in revenue i  
the product market.  However, if the patent assignee d cides that it is not justified to commercialize th  
patent, the firm will not be able to generate any profit from it except by licensing or selling it.  Therefore, 
the technological opportunity of a patent has a direct impact on the revenue and rent dissipation effect of 
its holding firm, regardless of whether it is commercialized or not. 
 Transaction costs are the expenses a firm incurs dring the licensing process, and include the 
coordination costs (Arora et al., 2001) and the motivation costs.  Coordination costs are the expenses for 
coordinating the licensor and licensee, and consisted of search costs (Palomeras, 2007), as searching for 
suitable licensees can take a long time and a high cost (Contractor, 1981); and administration costs such 




economic losses incurred by the patent holder due to the opportunistic behaviour of a potential patent 
licensee.  Such costs are a result of information asymmetries, the technological distance between the 
domains of licensor and licensee and the tacitness of the patent (Arora et al., 2001).  Garicano and Kaplan 
(2001) show that transaction costs can be reduced in the setting of internet business-to-business (B2B) 
market, as searching costs in this domain are trivial, and motivation costs are lowered by the 
minimization of information asymmetries.  Arora and Fosfuri (2003) found that lower transaction costs 
are required for licensing patents with stronger protection.  
 The creation of a firm’s own competition refers to the increase of its competition in the product 
market due to additional competition in the same market.  Assuming that a patent creates a technological 
opportunity, its assignee is likely to commercialize the patent and potentially makes a profit in the product 
market.  By licensing its patent, the patent assignee creates competition in the product market.  As a 
result, the profits it makes in the product market may decrease—a result known as the rent dissipation 
effect. 
The magnitude of the three main features described above are influenced by the nature of the 
technology (Fosfuri, 2006; Kim and Vonortas, 2006; Palomeras, 2007), the nature of the firm (Vonortas, 
2003), and the nature of the industry (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Shane, 2001;Gambardella, 2007).  
A number of characteristics at the technology, firm, and industry level are used to capture these natures.  
Therefore, these characteristics remained as important factors for a patent holder when making licensing 
decisions, and will be discussed in depth in the next s ction. 
The size of the patent holding firm; however, has not previously been considered as a key factor 
in the literature on licensing decisions.  In fact, firms of different sizes vary in their licensing policies.  
Using the empirical result of EU patents, Giuri et al. (2007) found that 10% of patents owned by large 




26% and 18%.  Gambardella et al. (2007) also show that a patent is more likely to be licensed if it is 
owned by smaller firms.  These results clearly demonstrate that large firms are less active in the 
technology market than small firms.  Large firms often have greater resources than their smaller 
counterparts, including better complementary assets and larger marketing and advertising budgets.  With 
these resources, they are able to manufacture their products at a lower cost and market them more 
aggressively.  As a result, it is more likely that large firms will enjoy larger share of the product market.  
In this case, the decision to license the originating patent of the products will create competition in the 
product market, and may lead to the rent dissipation effect outweighing the revenue effect.  Therefore, 
large firms may be less willing to license the patents that they have commercialized.  Small firms, on the 
other hand, maybe at a financial advantage after lic nsing their patents, because the revenue effect is 
bigger than the rent dissipation effect when their market share is small.  The impact of firm size on each 
characteristic, the licensing determinants, and consequently the licensing decisions are explained in detail 
in the following section. 
 
3.2 Characteristics at the Technology, Firm, and In dustry Level and Hypotheses 
The nature of a patent, its holder, and the market it belongs to can affect its technological opportunity, its 
transaction costs, and the creation of competition for its holding firm, which consequently has an impact 
on the potential profit from licensing.  In the literature, a number of characteristics are used to capture 
these natures.  For example, the characteristics of a patent include usefulness, technological value, scope, 
and innovativeness; the market share, the complementary assets, and the experience in writing licensing 
contracts were used to represent the nature of the firm; and competition intensity was used to capture the 
nature of the market and the industry.  In the following, the impact of some of these characteristics w ll be 





The usefulness measures how useful or important a patent is to its assignee.  Naturally, the more useful 
that a patent is to its assignee, the more likely it is to be further developed internally, such as by 
commercializing it and developing other innovations ba ed on it.  Firms are more likely to commercialize 
innovations with which they have some expertise, at either the technological, manufactural, or 
commercializational level.   The reason for this is that they are more efficient in commercializing as they 
have more knowledgeable researchers, better complementary assets, and competitive advantages in 
manufacturing (Gambardella et al. 2007).  Such expertise is referred to as the core competency of the 
firm.  Therefore, the more closely related that an innovation is to the core competency of the firm, the
more useful it is to them.  However, only core competency at the technological level will be considere 
here.  
As a patent is commercialized by its assignee, profit will potentially be made in the product 
market.  When the assignee firm licenses the patent to another company that competes in the same 
product market, it is creating its own competition.  There is great potential in this situation for the rent 
dissipation effect to impact the assignee.  Therefore, firms must decide whether licensing their patents is 
justified; essentially, they must determine—whether or not the rent dissipation effect will outweigh the 
revenue effect of licensing.  Palomeras (2007) claims that unexploited technologies are the most likely 
candidates to be made available for pure-revenue licens ng, because the patent assignees do not face 
competition in the product market from the licensees.  However, this is the point where firms of different 





Hypothesis 1: Large firms are less willing to license patents that are useful to them comparing to 
those that are not useful to them, whereas small firms are more willing to license patent that are 
useful to them. 
 
 The first hypothesis can be analyzed in two cases: that in which the patent creates technological 
opportunities, or that in which it does not.  In the latter case, its assignee will not attempt to 
commercialize it, and hence the assignee will not make any profit from it in the product market.  Then, if 
some other company license and commercialize it, the rent dissipation effect will be zero.   As a result, 
the total effect is always non-negative, and so all firms will be willing to put the patent on the market, 
regardless of their size. 
 On the other hand, when the patent creates technologica  opportunities, it is likely that its 
assignee will commercialize it and thus gain profit from it in the product market.  Since it creates 
technological opportunities, other companies may find it attractive and possibly attempt to license it.  If 
the assignee is a large firm, in an industry in which the firm enjoys core competency, it is more likely that 
the firm has a large market share in the product market.  As a result, the patent assignee creates its own 
competition with a significant rent dissipation effect, which is comparable to the revenue effect of 
licensing, and potentially has a negative effect on he overall profit.  Also, Teece (1986) argues that firms 
with complementary assets have a lower propensity to license, and large firms are likely to own those 
assets for innovation (Gambardella et al., 2007).  Therefore, large firms are less willing to license a patent 
that creates technological opportunities.  In contrast, the rent dissipation effect is not as significant if the 
patent assignee is a small firm, because a small firm is often restricted by scarce resources, and is less 




a smaller market share in the product market.  Therefore, even if the patent itself is useful, a small firm 
will still be willing to list it on the market.  
 
3.2.2 Technological Value 
The technological value of a patent refers to its technological significane in its respective field.  Shane 
(2001) refers this characteristic to the importance of the patent, and it is often connected to the economic 
value of the patent, as Harhoff et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2005) show that these variables are positively 
correlated.  Therefore, the higher the technological value of a patent, the more technological opportunities 
it creates for its assignee, in both the product market and the technology market, as it also attracts 
potential licensees.  Using different proxies for the technological value of a patent, Gamberdella et l. 
(2007) have shown that the economic value of a patent is positively correlated the patent assignee’s 
willing to license patents and the actual licensing activities. 
  
3.2.3 Scope 
The scope of a patent is the breadth across which the product that it embodies will be protected.  
Klemperer (1990) defines scope as the horizontal product space protected by the patent.  Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990) suggest that a broader patent allows the innovator to earn a high flow rate of profits during 
the lifetime of the patent.  Lerner (1994) demonstrates that the patent scope of a firm’s patents has a 
positive effect on the value of the firm.  Therefor, scope can be determined from two perspectives: 
technological, and economical.  Patents with a larger scope tend to be better protected.  As Merges and 
Nelson (1990) state, the broader the scope, the larg r the number of competing products and processes 




patents with stronger protection would incur lower transaction costs, and patents with lower transaction 
costs are more likely to be licensed.  Also, the larger the scope of a patent, the more applications it has, 
the more technological opportunities can be found for it in different industries, the higher the number of 
products that can be embodied by it, and therefore, the lower the chance that its assignee will create 
competition when licensing it.  As a result, patents with a larger scope are more attractive to the pot ntial 




The innovativeness of a patent refers to the degree to which it builds on previous innovations.  An 
innovative innovation can be largely improved in terms of technology or costs compared to the original 
product, and hence capable of replacing the latter in the market.   
Commercializing such an innovation often requires nw complementary assets and a change in 
the organizational environment (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  When large firms are market 
incumbents, they have less incentive to make radical improvements to their current products, and hence 
are less productive to exploit very innovative innovations (Henderson, 1993).  For instance, consider a 
large company that owns a highly innovative patent which can be developed into a new product that is a 
direct substitution of one of the firm’s current products.  If it chooses not to commercialize the patented 
innovation, to avoid the new product forces the incumbent out of the market, it will not license the patent 
to other companies.  These patents will instead end up being used strategically to block rivals (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001).  On the other hand, if the company does commercialize the patent, then licensing the 
patent will create competition of its own, which causes profit dissipation and leads to potential decreases 




the willingness of small firms to license highly innovative patents is ambiguous since they are more 
flexible in making radical changes, which gives them a competitive advantage in the product market, and 
makes them reluctant to license.  However, they mayalso benefit more by licensing innovative patents if 
they do not have a large market share.  Looking at firms of different sizes, Palomeras (2007) shows that
the market incumbent has an incentive to license pat nts that are more innovative, because high 
coordination costs can be alleviated in a market that is not a typical distant market.  To summarize, th  
following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The patents listed on the market by large firms are less innovative than those which 
they do not list.  
 
3.2.5 Market Share 
The term market share refers to the portion that the patent assignee dominates of the product market 
which a particular patent has been commercialized.  It is assumed here in order for this to make sense, 
that the patent has been commercialized by the patent holder and that the commercialized product is 
available in the product market.  Fosfuri (2006) shows that, in an empirical study that omits small firms, 
that the larger the licensor’s share in the product market, the smaller its rate of technology licensing.  In 
other words, market share is negatively correlated to the patent holder’s actual licensing activities.   
Also, it is worthwhile to note that market share in the product market of a firm is a crucial factor 
in determining the magnitude of the rent dissipation effect, and hence the total effect, which in turn 
influences the licensing decision.  When a firm has a mall market share, rent dissipation will be 
insignificant, and the total effect is likely to bepositive. Then, the firm will have an incentive to license 




rent dissipation effect may be large enough to outweigh the revenue effect.  The firm will then be 
reluctant to place its patent on the market. 
As discussed before, large incumbents are more likely to have a large market share, as they have 
more resources compared to their small counterparts.  As a result, large firms are less willing to license 
their patent in order to protect their market share.  The magnitude of the rent dissipation effect andthe 
propensity to license; however, is ambiguous for small firms.  They may be reluctant to license if they 
have a large share in the market for the same reason as large firms, but meanwhile they may not have the 
resources to defend their market share in the long ru , which force them to license and transfer the source 
of revenue from the product market to the technology market.  The above arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The larger the share that a firm has of the market in a technological class, the less 
likely the firm is to license patents belonging to that technological class. 
 
3.2.6 Competition 
Competition refers to the competition intensity of the product market of the product that embodies the 
originating patent, and the same assumption as the market share characteristic is made.  Consider an 
extreme case, in which a firm faces no competition in the technology market, and hence none in the 
product market.  Then, as a monopoly, it has no incentive to license its patent.  However, when the 
number of technology holders increases, its willingness to license may also increase.  Using an empirical 
study, Fosfuri (2006) demonstrates that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the rate of 
actual technology licensing and the number of potential technology suppliers.  In other words, starting 




while the number of technology holders also increases.  However, when the number of technology 
holders reaches a certain value, the rate of technology licensing decreases as the number of technology 
holders increases, due to a bounded number of potential licensees and the increase in competition in the 
technology market.  Assuming that there are multiple technology holders, Arora and Fosfuri (2003) 
developed the revenue versus competition model that s ows a patent holder would have an incentive to 
license even if the rent dissipation effect outweighs the revenue effect, due to the competition in the 
product market.  Using empirical data from Europe, Gambardella et al. (2007) show that there is a 
positive correlation between the number of technology producers and both the firm’s willingness to 
license and actual licensing activity. 
Comparing firms of different sizes, the willingness to license for large firms is higher as 
competition gets more intense, and is ambiguous for small firms.  As a market becomes more 
competitive, there is a higher chance that other technology holders will license their technology to new 
entrants.  In the former case, since the originating large firm cannot deter entry, it would simply tro 
license its technology like the other technology holders in order to gain royalties.  As a result, their 
propensity to license increases with the intensity of competition.  On the other hand, small firms may not 
attempt to block entry even if the competition is not intense as they find it difficult to defend their market 
share in the long run.  So, instead of making profit in the product market, they do not hesitate as much to 
create competition and make profit in the technology market regardless of the competition intensity.  
Therefore, impact of competition factor on willingness to license for small firms is ambiguous.   Also, 
Fosfuri (2006) claims that small firms face a less intensive trade-off between revenue effect and rent
dissipation effect, but he does not actually show evidence to support his assertion.  His claim will be 





Hypothesis 4: The more intense the competition in the product market, the higher the willingness of 








Data and the Empirical Model 
 
In order to show evidence in support of the hypotheses, an observational study, a method for drawing 
inferences about the effect of a treatment on subjects, is conducted.  In this study, the treatment is the 
availability of patents on the market, and the result of the impact of this treatment on the subject is not 
deliberately controlled by the experimenter as in a controlled experiment.  Instead, the variables are 
collected in such a way that those of the treated group and of the controlled group are collected.  Also, 
there are two reasons why patented technologies are used as a measure of technologies in the market: 
their representability as the technologies traded on the market and data availability. 
For data collection, patents that are both on the market and not on the market were first collected.  
Second, these two groups were further broken down into four groups by separating the size of the patent 
assignees.  Third, the characteristics of the patents in these four groups were gathered.  By performing a 
statistical analysis of the characteristics of the market group and the control group of both small and l rge 
companies, and comparing the result between them, one can discover the impact of assignees’ size on the 
variation in characteristics.  As a result, the differences in licensing decisions can be determined.  The 
steps in data collection and the detail of the empirical model will be explained below. 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
As mentioned above, the characteristics of patents that are on the market and those that are not on the 
market must be collected from both small and large firms.  This can be done through the following step.  




licensing decisions of small and large firms, the list of patents in each group must be subdivided into two 
market groups according to the size of their assignees.  Third, the control groups of these two market 
groups are obtained by matching the name of the assignee, the application year, and the technological 
class, which is represented by the International Patent Classification (IPC) code.  As a result, four groups 
of patents are formed: the market group for small firms, the market group for large firms, the control 
group for small firms, and the control group for large firms.  The fourth step involves adjusting the ratio 
of market group to control group of large firms so that it is similar to that of small firms by selecting 
random samples from the large firms control group.  The fifth and final step is performed, after the patent 
list for each group is obtained; patent data for the independent variables of the model are collected for 
statistical analysis.  The following paragraphs explain the details of each step in the data collection 
process. 
 Recall that the first step in data collection is to collect patents for the market group.  Note that 
there are many marketplaces and it is not feasible to collect patents from all of them.  Therefore, an 
internet marketplace is selected as representative.  Following Palomeras (2007), Yet2.com 
(www.yet2.com), arguably one of the largest and most comprehensiv  internet technology marketplaces, 
was chosen.  It is assumed that this marketplace repr s nts the whole patent market.  In other words, if a 
patent is not listed in the marketplace mentioned above, it is assumed that the patent is not listed in any 
other marketplace.  Palomeras (2007) also asserts that internet marketplaces attract licensing activities for 
non-strategic, or pure-revenue, purposes, so he assume  that all patents in Yet2.com are listed for such 
purposes.  This paper adopts the same assumption. 
 Next, the whole list of patents obtained from the marketplace must be trimmed in order to satisfy 
the three requirements of the focus of the research: each patent must have only one assignee, the assignee 




The first requirement removes some confusion in making licensing decisions created by multiple 
assignees.  The second requirement ensures that the patent assignees in the market group match the focus 
of the research.  The type of assignees can be found usi g online company databases such as Mergent 
Online and Hoovers.  The third requirement ensures that the patent assignees have not been forced to list
them due to their inability to generate revenue through the product market.   The ability of a company to 
generate revenue through the product market is determin d by whether or not it sells its own product, and 
this can be checked at the official website of the company.   
In the second step, the resulting list of patents is further divided into two groups according to the 
assignee size.  The definition of a large firm is one that has over 500 employees (Acz and Audretsch, 
1988), while anything below that is considered to be a small firm, or, more officially Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs).  Here, the two groups of patents in he market group are collected: the one for large 
firms has 917 patents, and the one for small firms has 30 patents. 
In step three, patents from the control group must be collected.  With those two market groups of 
patents, the corresponding control groups can be found by matching the name of assignees, the filing 
years of the patents, and the IPC codes.  There is an assumption in matching of the names of assignees: 
subsidiaries can make their own decisions.  For example, even though it is a subsidiary of the Textron 
Inc., Bell Helicopter is assumed to be authorized to make its own licensing decisions independently.  
Therefore, a patent assigned to Textron Inc. will not be in the control group of patents owned by Bell 
Helicopter.  Also, matching IPC codes involves not only the first code, but the whole list.  For example, a 
patent in the market group has a few distinct IPC codes.  Then, any patents with an IPC code that matches 
anyone of the patent’s IPC codes are considered a part of the control group, given that the name of the 
assignee and the filing year also match.  Lastly, the market group includes small firms with patents that 




filed during that same period frame as well.  The patents in the market group of large firms were applied 
from 1983 to 2004, so the patents in the corresponding control group have to be applied between 1983 
and 2004.  After matching those variables, one alsoneeds to check that not all the patents owned by a
company are listed on the market.  Otherwise, it will be impossible to find a control group for those 
patents and there will be nothing with which to compare them.   
Here, the resulting list of patents in the control group is very long for large firms, and is very 
short for small firms.  However, for purposes of comparison, the ratio of the market group size to control 
group size of both small and large firms should be similar.  Therefore, the fourth step is to form a new 
control group of large firms by selecting a random sample from the original control group of large firms.  
To be specific, 2712 patents were chosen from 81133 patents in the population.  The patent lists of the 
market group and control group for small firms and large firms were then obtained. 
 Finally, in the fifth step, the patent data for the independent variables and covariates of the model 
for all groups have to be collected.  Since the application years of some of the patents are after 1999, the 
NBER patent data, which covers only up to 1999, cannot be used.  As a result, the retrieval of the patnt 
data from the USPTO website was done by a script.   
Additionally, it was found that the number of forward citations for patents granted for less than 
ten years is much less than those granted for more than ten years.  The reason for this is that normally a 
patent receives most of its citations in the first ten to fifteen years after its application; then, for a patent 
applied within the last ten years, it would not have received all of its citations.  The problem is called the 
patent citation truncation.  To solve the problem, the number of forward citations and self-forward 
citations for all patents in the data set are transformed using the “fixed-effects” approach developed by 
Hall et al. (2001).  The key function of this approach is to have one able to compare forward citations of 




citations of all patents applied in any year may not be the same as that in another year, the differenc  is 
not caused by “real” technological impact, but rather by “artifacts” of changes in patent examination 
practices, such as changes in patent examination policy.  As a result, the real average number of forward 
citations of all patents applied in any year is thesame across all years.  For example, if one wants to 
compare ten forward citations of a patent applied in 1994 to ten forward citations of a patent applied in 
2004 using the “fixed-effects” approach, he would compare the values of ten divided by the average 
number of forward citations of all patents applied in 1984 to that applied in 1994.  With this approach, the 
weight of a forward citation of patents applied in d fferent years may be different, but the average forward 
citations of patents filed in each year are assumed to weight the same across all years.  Such calculations 
use the average number of forward citations per patent in each year, as shown in Table 1. 
Lastly, it is worthwhile to mention that the data collection of patents from Yet2.com was 
performed during early 2008, and the retrieval of patent data from the USPTO website started in mid-
2008, and ended in late 2008.   
 
4.2 Empirical Model 
A regression analysis is performed to test several hypotheses described in the previous section.  In order 
to discover the correlation between a firm’s willingness to license a patent and the characteristics of the 
originating patent, its assignee and the industry it belongs to, a binary variable known as “Market” is the 
dependent variable of the regression model.  Market is considered equal to one if the patent is made 
available on the market, and equals zero if not.  Since the dependent variable is binary, the probit model is 

































                             Table 1. Average number of forward citations per patent for each year 
 
Several requirements must be satisfied in order for the results of the probit regression to be 
correctly interpreted, including the lack of undue influence of individual observations on the fitted model, 
the absence of multicollinearity, and the statistical independence of the observations.  When running 
regression for a similar problem, Palomeras (2007) uses a probit random effects model because his data 
did not satisfy the last requirement.  This study uses the tests in the statistical package Stata to verify 




Cook’s D is used.  The value of Cook’s D for an observation is always non-negative; and the higher it is, 
the more influential the observation is.  The rule of thumb when using this technique is that if an 
observation has a Cook’s D value greater than 4/n - where n is the total number of observations in the 
sample - it may merit further investigation.  Next, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance (the 
inverse of VIF) are used to check for multicollinearity.  The rule of thumb here is that, if a variable has a 
VIF value above 10, or a tolerance value lower than 0.1, it requires further investigation.  Lastly, the 
observations may not be independent between firms.  For example, the patents owned by a certain firm 
may, on average, have a higher number of forward citations than those owned by other firms.  In this 
case, therefore, the cluster option is applied so that the data satisfies the requirement for independence of 
observation. 
Notice, also, that a number of independent variables ar  log transformed to reduce their skewness 
and are added one before transformation to avoid mathematical error.  These variables include the number 
of forward citations, backward citations, self-forward citataions, self-backward citations, claims, and 
inventors.  
 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
In order to predict the dependent variable, variables that capture the characteristics at the technological, 
firm, and industry level and covariates are used. 
 
Usefulness: There are two proxies representing such characteristics: the technological core and the 
number of self-forward citations.  As mentioned above, each firm has its core competencies.  Focusing on 




likely it is to be commercialized by the firm, and hence the more useful it is to the firm, ceteris paribus.  
Therefore, the technological core can be employed as another proxy for usefulness.  It is a binary variable, 
which equals one if its technological class is a core of its assignee, and equals zero otherwise.  This is a 
measure that was first used by Song et al. (2003), and then revised by Palomeras (2007).  According to 
the latter, a technological class is identified as a core of a firm if it has more than 5% patent share of the 
patents granted to the firm within a certain period.  The period of the application year of the patents for 
the proxy here is the same as the application year of the patents both in the market group and in the 
control group.  Also note that the technological clss of a patent is identified using the US technological 
class system.   
A self-forward citation of a patent is a forward citation that is assigned to the same assignee as the 
originating patent.  When a patent is cited by patents from the same firm, it must be valuable to the firm
in terms of its technological aspect, as the firm has further internally developed it and based other 
innovations on it.  Hall et al. (2005) show that the number of patent self-citations in a firm has a positive 
effect on the market value of the firm’s intangible stock of knowledge.  Therefore, the higher the number 
of self-forward citations that a patent receives, the more useful that patent is to the firm. 
 
Technological Value: This characteristic is represented by the proxy of the number of forward citations, 
which is a simple count of the number of patents that have cited the originating patent.  The higher t 
number of forward citations that a patent has, the higher its technological value.  This is, in fact, one of 
the most common and widely used proxies for evaluating patents in the literature.  Trajtenberg (1990), 
Harhoff et al. (1999), and Hall et al. (2005) show that the number of forward citations is positively 




Richardson (2004) also discovered that the number of forward citations has a positive effect on a firm’s 
potential performance in the stock market. 
 
Scope: The scope of a patent is the breadth across which te product embodied by it is protected.  It can 
be determined from both the technological and economic perspectives.  Therefore, there are two distinct 
proxies that can represent such characteristics, generality and the number of claims.  The first proxy 
represents the technological scope, and the second one represents the economic scope. 
Generality is a Herfindahl-typed index that calculates the diversification of the technological 
classes of a patent’s forward citations and was first used by Trajtenberg et al (1996).  The variable 
explains how broad the technological classes are of patents that have cited the originating patent.  Since 
its creation, generality has become one of the standard measures of the scope of a patent.  For example, 
Hall et al. (2001) included it in the widely-used NBER database. 
The number of claims in a patent represents how well th  patent is protected in terms of its 
applicable functionalities.  Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Palomeras (2003) use the number of 
claims as a proxy for patent scope, and claim that the higher it is, the better the patent is protected, and 
hence the broader the scope. 
 
Innovativeness: Two proxies are used here to capture the innovativeness of a patent: originality and the 
number of backward citations.  Originality of a patent, similar to generality, is a Herfindahl-typed index 
that calculates the technological diversification of a patent’s backward citations.  It shows the breadth nd 
the diffusion of the technological fields of the patents that cited by the originating patent.  If thepatents 




low.  Originality was first used by Trajtenberg et al. (1996), and has become one of the standard quality 
measures of patent in the NBER patent data (Hall et a , 2001).  Palomeras (2003) suggests that the lowr 
the degree of originality, the lower the degree of innovativeness, as it is more likely that the innovation 
makes a sequential, rather than radical, improvement. 
 The number of backward citations is a simple count of the number of patents that have been cited 
by the originating patent.  It was first used by Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) as a proxy for the 
innovativeness of a patent, who suggest that the low r the number of backward citations, the higher th 
innovativeness, as the patent depends less on previous knowledge. 
 
Market Share: It refers here to the portion that the firm holds of the product market, in which a given 
patent is commercialized.  However, the actual measur s of market share are very difficult to obtain for 
three reasons.  First, it is difficult to discover whether or not a patent has been commercialized.  Scond, 
if the patent has been commercialized, it is difficult to find the corresponding product in the market.  
Third, the market share of the product market for each firm is also difficult to obtain.  Therefore, instead 
of measuring the share that a firm has of the product market, a similar method proposed by Gambardella 
et al. (2007) for capturing intensity of competition in the product market, the market share in the 
technology market of the firm is obtained.   
The market share proxy now refers to the portion held by the firm of the industry in which the 
U.S. primary technological class of the patent exists.  It is calculated by finding the number of patents 
applied from 1983 to 2006 - which is the same as the application year of all the patents in the study - that 
has the same U.S. primary class and subclass as the originating patent.  The market share of a given firm




Competition: The Competition index refers to that within the product market that embodies the 
originating patent.  However, similar to market share, it is not easy to discover the actual value here.  
Therefore, the proxy for competition is adjusted to that of the technology market of the technological 
class of that patent.  Gambardella et al. (2007) use a proxy that measures the technological competition of 
a technological class by finding the share of the pat nts held by the top four applicants in each 4-digit IPC 
codes.  They claim that competition within the technology market is correlated to that within the product 
market.  This paper uses the same proxy, except that the U.S. primary class and subclass is used for 
matching technological classes instead of IPC codes.  Note that in this study the shares of the top three 
firms are used because these give better results than the top four and top five firms. 
 
Covariates: Two sets of covariates, or controls, which represent patents and firms, are used in this model.  
At the technological level, the number of self-citations made, the number of inventors and filing year of a 
patent are all used, following Palomeras (2007).  The first variable represents the internal flow of 
knowledge (Hall et al., 2001), and is crucial to capture if one wants to measure the true meaning of 
external flow of knowledge, or citations.  The number of inventors indicates the amount of tacit 
knowledge and knowhow that may be useful for the pat nt, since knowhow can smoothen the transaction 
and potentially lower the transaction cost.  The last technological variable is the filing year, or the 
application year, of a patent.  This is important because it takes into account technological changes ov r 
time, and is especially useful for industries in which technologies grow at a fast pace.  At the firm level, 
USfirm, a dummy variable that tells whether or not the patent holder is a U.S. firm, is used.  This variable 
also tells whether or not the holder has engaged in business activities in the U.S. and is particularly true 
for small companies.  As a result, non-U.S. firms are less concerned about the rent dissipation effect, 




Variable Description Characteristic 
Core    
Dummy, equals to 1 if the patent belongs to 
the technological core competency of the 
assignee 
Usefulness 
Selfcr The number of patent citations received that 
have the exact same assignee name 
Usefulness 
SelfcrFix Same as the above, but transformed using the 
"fixed-effects" approach 
Usefulness 
Creceived The number of patent citations received Technological value 
CreceivedFix 
Same as the above, but transformed using the 
"fixed-effects" approach Technological value 
Claims The number of claims of the patent Scope 
Generality The Herfindahl index on the spread of the 
technological classes of citation received 
Scope 
Cmade 
The number of citations made; the lower the 
index, the higher the innovativeness Innovativeness 
Originality The Herfindahl index on the spread of the 
technological classes of citation made 
Innovativeness 
MarketShare 
The market share of the assignee in the 




The competition intensity of industry that the 
patent belongs to; the lower the index, the 
more competitive it is 
Competition 
Selfcm The number of patent citations made that 
have the exact same assignee name 
Technological Control 
Inventors The number of inventors of the patent Technological Control 
Filedyr The filed year of the patent Technological Control 
USfirm Dummy, equals to 1 if the patent assignee is a 
U.S. BES 
Firm Control 






Empirical Analysis and Implications 
 
Using the Cook’s D, influential observations are detected and deleted from the whole database.  The size 
of the patent sample then decreases from 3629 to 3521 for large firms, and from 108 to 101 for small 
firms.  Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics for variables of patents from large and small firms, 
respectively.  Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the VIF and tolerance of the variables.  Observe that none of the 
VIF values is greater than 10, which means that there is no multicollinearity problem present here.  Table 
7 shows the estimations of the probit model for both large and small firms.  Notice that the influential 
observations have already been eliminated and are not included in these tables.  
 The estimated results for both variables of the technological core and the number of self-forward 
citations has provided solid evidence for the first hypothesis.  Although the coefficient of the forme for 
small firms is positive but not statistically significant, that of large firms is negative and strongly 
statistically significant.  The other variable, self-forward citations, has also provided even stronger 
evidence.  Its coefficient for large firms is negative and strongly statistically significant, which agrees 
with the technological core variable, and that of small firms is positive and also strongly statistically 
significant.  The probit estimation demonstrates that e more self-citations received by a patent held by a 
large firm, or the closer the patent is to the firm’s technological core, the less likely it is that the patent 
will be listed.  In other words, large firms are less willing to place their useful patents on the market.  On 
the other hand, unlike their larger counterparts, small firms are more willing to license their useful 
patents.  Therefore, these coefficients convincingly support the first hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis claims that the patents listed on the market by large firms are less 




            Market = 0 Market = 1 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Mean 
Core 3521 0.3001988 0.4584094 0 1 0.3272929 0.2105263 
Selfcr 3521 0.8136893 2.399324 0 48 0.8402367 0.7258262 
SelfcrFix 3521 0.09659 0.2802068 0 3.845489 0.1025668 0.0768088 
Creceived 3521 8.580801 13.50805 0 150 8.086169 10.21787 
CreceivedFix 3521 0.8840642 1.252701 0 11.93281 0.8393187 1.032157 
Claims 3521 15.7069 11.69282 1 146 15.4057 16.70379 
Generality 3521 0.5435175 0.3484431 0 1 0.5294635 0.5900314 
Cmade 3521 12.13831 18.98118 0 391 12.01701 12.53978 
Originality 3521 0.471656 0.2894332 0 1 0.4633966 0.4989919 
MarketShare 3521 0.0515402 0.0850495 0 1 0.058132 0.0297234 
Competition 3521 0.2395129 0.162979 0.027 1 0.2557426 0.185798 
Selfcm 3521 1.000852 2.642367 0 48 1.058802 0.8090575 
Inventors 3521 2.464641 1.588654 1 18 2.470784 2.444308 
Filed 3521 1994.853 5.547535 1983 2005 1994.641 1995.553 
USfirm 3521 0.8230616 0.3816707 0 1 0.8213757 0.8286414 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for variables of patents from large firms 
 
 
            Market = 0 Market = 1 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Mean 
Core 101 0.9207921 0.27141 0 1 0.9210526 0.92 
Selfcr 101 0.7029703 1.931551 0 13 0.5526316 1.16 
SelfcrFix 101 0.5028711 1.714853 0 11.61924 0.401047 0.8124164 
Creceived 101 8.653465 13.67438 0 65 8.960526 7.72 
CreceivedFix 101 2.349861 4.139283 0 23.23848 2.40799 2.173148 
Claims 101 19.84158 16.85451 1 103 18.11842 25.08 
Generality 101 0.4913558 0.3596369 0 1 0.4610898 0.5833642 
Cmade 101 24.26733 25.05789 1 159 25.18421 21.48 
Originality 101 0.5647358 0.2711502 0 0.9060642 0.5698554 0.5491723 
MarketShare 101 0.0250099 0.0288851 0 0.105 0.0225395 0.03252 
Competition 101 0.1982574 0.1180214 0.037 0.708 0.2110263 0.15944 
Selfcm 101 0.6336634 0.8913223 0 4 0.6315789 0.64 
Inventors 101 3.405941 2.871161 1 16 3.763158 2.32 
Filed 101 1999.614 4.022363 1992 2006 1999.395 2000.28 
USfirm 101 0.8910891 0.3130811 0 1 0.8815789 0.92 




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Core 1.13 0.883014 
LogSelfcrFix 1.37 0.730743 
LogCreceivedFix 1.4 0.716359 
LogClaims 1.07 0.935992 
Generality 1.06 0.94563 
LogCmade 1.47 0.680935 
Originality 1.27 0.789874 
MarketShare 1.71 0.584991 
Competition 1.86 0.537245 
LogSelfcm 1.34 0.747781 
LogInventors 1.09 0.920673 
Filed 1.22 0.820002 
USfirm 1.37 0.731855 
Mean VIF 1.33   




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Core 1.18 0.848594 
LogSelfcrFix 1.9 0.527539 
LogCreceivedFix 1.94 0.515184 
LogClaims 1.31 0.765289 
Generality 1.39 0.718849 
LogCmade 2.22 0.45128 
Originality 1.77 0.564161 
MarketShare 1.52 0.658632 
Competition 1.36 0.737202 
LogSelfcm 1.51 0.662649 
LogInventors 1.74 0.57409 
Filed 2.15 0.464974 
USfirm 1.27 0.788615 
Mean VIF 1.63   




     Table 7. Probit estimation for both large and small firms 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10%; robust standard error of the coefficients are in parentheses
Variable     
                    Large firms                    Small firms 
Technological level     
Usefulness     
   Core   -0.2967698 (0.1060038) ***    0.4722439 (0.4795563) 
   Self-forward citations   -0.8412189 (0.2835086) ***    2.341526 (1.179064) ** 
Technological value     
   Forward citations    0.6959381 (0.1091733) ***   -0.8979599 (0.5892663) 
Scope     
   Claims    0.2227023 (0.1265621) *    2.263676 (0.4632283) *** 
   Generality    0.2061579 (0.067741) ***    0.4148866 (0.289572) 
Innovativeness     
   Backward citations    0.1218969 (0.1096104)    2.017469 (0.8022052) ** 
   Originality   -0.097917 (0.1411052)   -1.327827 (0.3190147) *** 
      
Firm level     
Market share     
   Market share   -1.742353 (0.5329053) ***    14.64449 (4.1053) *** 
      
Industry level     
Competition     
   Competition   -1.461507 (0.2469785) ***   -3.637967 (2.193422) * 
      
Control     
Technological control     
   Inventors   -0.0254704 (0.2493178)   -4.872622 (1.901167) *** 
   Self-backward citations    0.0115565 (0.152775)   -2.460021 (0.6478733) *** 
   Filed year    0.0208481 (0.0119298)*    0.1223165 (0.0615035) ** 
Firm Control     
   US firm   -0.1935805 (0.0732615)***   -0.2238792 (0.6319144) 
      
Statistical data     
  N 3521 101 
  Log pseudo-likelihood -1779.5909 -33.56352 




patents, namely numbers of backward citations and originality.  Note that the coefficients of both the 
variables for large firms are not statistically significant, which does not provide any evidence.  This can 
be caused by a number of factors.  The first possibility is that there is actually no correlation betwen the 
innovativeness of a patent and a large firm’s willingness to license, and therefore the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  The second possibility is that the proxies of backward citations and originality 
fail to capture the innovativeness of a patent, so these variables failed to influence the licensing decision 
of large firms.  The third possibility is that competition in the technology market due to the presence of 
multiple technology holders forces large firms to license innovative patents (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).  In 
this case, even if the originating patent holder does not license, the other technology holders will, thus 
motivating the originating patent holder to license.  On the other hand, the empirical result of these 
variables for small firms suggests that they are less willing to list highly innovative patents on the market.  
Such reluctance may be caused by their flexibility in organizational structure, which gives them an 
advantage in competing in the product market, and results in a high rent dissipation effect. 
The third hypothesis claims that the larger the market share that a firm holds in a particular 
technological class, the less likely it is that thefirm will be willing to license its patents belongi  to that 
technological class, and the empirical result agrees with this claim.  The coefficient of the variable market 
share for large firms is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which means that a large firm 
is more willing to license its patents if they belong to a technological class in which has a small market 
share, because the rent dissipation effect would outweighs the revenue effect should the firm decides to 
license.  Additionally, the coefficient of market share for small firms is positive and statistically strongly 
significant, which shows that small firms have an opp site licensing propensity to the large firms.  When 
a small firm has a large market share, it becomes more willing to license its patents because it may find it 




As a result, such a firm may have a different market strategy than a large firm; it aggressively engages in 
technology licensing and transforms its source of revenue from the product market to the technology 
market.  On the other hand, when a small firm has a sm ll market share, it tends to be less inclined to 
license the corresponding patents.  One reason for this is the inferior quality of the patents in question, 
which may be unattractive to potential licensees.  Therefore, in order to lower expenses, a small firmmay 
decide not to make their patents available on the market since this incurs a non-trivial listing cost. 
 The fourth hypothesis states that the higher the intensity of competition in the product market, the 
higher the willingness of a large firm to license its patents.  This is supported by the probit estimation 
since the coefficient of the competition variable is negative and statistically significant for large firms, 
while a lower value of the competition index represent  a more intense competition.  Recall that Fosfuri 
(2006) demonstrate the inverted U-shaped relationshp between the rate of technology licensing and the 
number of technology holders, which means the rate of licensing increases with the number of technology 
holders until the number of holders has reached a certain value.  However, this non-linear relationship 
only holds true for actual licensing activities whic  focus on the demand side of the market.  In this 
empirical result, the linear relationship between a firm’s willingness to license and competition intesity 
does not conflict with the above because it applies to the supply side of the market; even if the number of 
technology holders has reached a certain value, a firm’s propensity to license will not decrease.  In other 
words, that relationship in the supply side is monot ic.  On the other hand, the coefficient of the 
competition variable for small firms is statistically significant and even more negative than that of large 
firms.  It demonstrates that small firms are more sensitive to competition intensity in the industry and 
rejects the claims made by Fosfuri (2006) that small firms face a less intensive tradeoff between the 




Besides the above mentioned variables that support the hypotheses, the remaining variables also 
provide some interesting results.  The first one is the technological value of a patent.  Although the
coefficient for forward citations for small firms i not statistically significant, that for large firms is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which demonstrates that large firms are more willing 
to license patents with higher technological value.  This result agrees with the empirical studies by 
Gambardella et al. (2007) and Palomeras (2007).  They explained that patents with high technological 
value create more technological opportunities and are attractive to potential licensees.  At the same ti , 
these patents might not be internally developed.  As a result, the revenue effect outweighs the rent 
dissipation effect, and the profitability provides incentive for the patent holder to license.    
Secondly, observe that the two variables for scope generally have the same results.  The 
coefficients of the number of claims for both the model for large firms and small firms are positive and 
statistically significant, which shows that firms are generally more willing to license patents with a larger 
scope.  In particular, the coefficient of the small firms is a lot larger than that of the large firms, shows 
that he licensing decisions of small firms are particularly sensitive to the patent scope than are those of 
large firms.  The coefficients for generality, on the other hand, are both positively correlated to a firm’s 
willingness to license, although only that for large firms is statistically significant. 
The next two variables are the number of self-citations made and the number of inventors, where 
both are technological controls.  The coefficients for both are not statistically significant for large firms, 
and are both negative and significant for small firms.  This result demonstrates that small firms are more 
willing to license patents with a lower number of self-backward citations—which are more innovative 
and less related to the technological core of the firm—and have fewer inventors.  Another important 
variable is the filing year of the patent, the coefficients of which are statistically significant for both large 




more willing to license recent patents, but the filing year is generally not an influential factor.  Finally, the 
firm covariate of USfirm is negatively correlated to the propensity to license for large firms, meaning that 
large firms without business activities in the United States have a high willingness to license.  This 








This paper answered the research question “What are the differences between large firms and small firms 
when making licensing decisions?”  In line with the revenue versus competition framework (Arora and 
Fosfuri, 2003) - assuming that profit is the only driver behind licensing and considering only firms with 
commercialization capabilities - this empirical study shows that large firms weigh the rent dissipation 
effect higher than revenue effect.  At the technological level, large firms are less willing to license patents 
that are useful to them.  At the firm level, they are more inclined to license patents that they have 
commercialized in areas where they have a smaller market share.  Lastly, at the industry level, they have a 
higher propensity to license patents within industrie  with more competitive markets.   
On the other hand, small firms see the revenue effect as being more important than the rent 
dissipation effect when making licensing decisions.  Therefore, although taking on the risk of suffering 
from the rent dissipation effect, they are more likly to put patents that are useful to them on the market.  
At the firm level, the market share of a small firm in the product market is positively correlated to the
willingness to license a patent that the product is embodied from.  In other words, the larger the market 
share of a small firm, the more likely it would place the patent on the market, as it may find it difficult to 
maintain its large market share in a long run, so strategically it aims to change its source of revenue from 
the product market to the technology market.  Whereas, when its market share is small, it may be caused 
by its inferior technologies, which are not attractive to the potential licensees.  Therefore, the firm may 
not even bother to place the patents on the market since the listing costs may not be a trivial amount for it.  
Finally, at the industry level, small firms are also more inclined to license patents in industries with high 




Meanwhile, this paper also unveils some interesting results.  First, while innovativeness of a 
patent is not an important factor in making licensing decision for large firms, it is negatively correlat d to 
small firms’ willingness to license.  One possible reason is that small firms are more flexible in their 
organizational structure, which gives them an advantage in competing in the product market, and hence 
lower their willingness to license.  Second, the technological value of a patent is positively correlat d to 
the willingness to license for large firms.  Gambardella et al. (2007) has actually showed that the 
economic value of a patent is positively correlated to both the willingness to license and actual licensing 
activities of firms of all sizes.  Such willingness can be driven by the existence of multiple technology 
holders, which forces the large firms to license valuable patents (Arora and Fosfuri, 2006).  Third, 
although small firms are more sensitive to scope than large firms when making licensing decisions, both 
large and small firms are more willing to license patents with broader scope.  The reason is that the larg r 
the scope of a patent, the stronger the protection, and the more technological opportunities it creates, thus 
resulting in a higher revenue effect, which is an effect that all firms rate highly. 
This study also encountered a few limitations.  First, the sample size of patents from large and 
small firms is uneven.  One reason is that the online technology market has a listing cost, which may be 
non-trivial for small firms.  However, it also reflcts the realistic situation in the market for technology: 
such market is still underdeveloped and is inefficient in many aspects.  Second, a number of restricting 
assumptions were made throughout the whole study, from theory development to empirical study.  The 
major one is that it was assumed that profit is the only driver behind licensing activities.  As a result, any 
strategic reasons for licensing, such as cross-licens ng and setting standard for the industry, were ignored.  
Consequently, it is further assumed that all of the patents listed on the internet marketplace Yet2.com are 




This topic can be further explored in several direct ons.  To begin with, this paper focuses purely 
on the supply side of the market.  It would be; however, very interesting to consider the demand side 
along with the actual licensing deals, given the avail bility of data on these.  Then, different type of 
licensing contracts, including exclusive licensing, on-exclusive licensing, and cross-licensing, could be 
differentiated, compared, and contrasted.  Next, the different structures of licensing contacts can also be 
analyzed, such as per-unit royalties and lump sum royalties.  Finally, although this paper includes patents 
across all industries, it does not separate the patents by industry due to the restrictions of the sample size.  
Notice that the nature, structure, and characteristics of different industries can vary significantly.  
Therefore, should the opportunity arise in the future, it would be very useful to compare licensing 
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